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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LULU BLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
V. PERSHING NELSON,
RALPH L. SMITH and
GLADYS SMITH, d/b/a
GLADYS' BEAUTY SALON,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13470

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT NELSON
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs on premises owned by the defendant Nelson and leased in part to
the defendants Smith.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial
court granted the respective motions of both defendants
for directed verdicts in their behalf.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Nelson seeks affirmance of the judgment
of dismissal entered by the trial court in his favor.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Nelson, a practicing attorney in Provo,
Utah, was the owner of a building located at the corner
of University Avenue and 200 North in Provo, Utah. On
the date of the accident in question, June 25, 1971, the
defendants Smith d / b / a Gladys' Beauty Salon, occupied
the southwest corner of the ground floor of the building
in question and also used for storage a portion of the
basement area. Another tenant also had a right to use
the basement storage area.
At the Southeast corner of the building there is a
garage for employee parking (Ex. 1). In the southwest
portion of the garage there is a large metal-covered service door which allows entrance into the rear of the
building (Ex. 2). This door opens inward to a landing
area which is approximately 10 feet by 5 feet in diameter
(Ex. 4). There is a stairway on the west side of the landing to the basement area, and a rear door to Gladys'
Beauty Salon operated by the defendants Smith is situated
at the southwest corner of the landing area and opens
inward into the salon (Ex. 3). Illumination of the landing
area is provided by a light bulb hanging directly over the
landing area. The light is activated by a switch on the
east side of the door which leads into Gladys' Beauty
Salon. The door leading into Gladys' has a sign on it
which reads "EMPLOYEES ONLY" (T. 9 1 , Exs. 3 & 25).
During the time the Smiths occupied the premises,
Mr. Smith maintained the rear entrance area (T. 93).
Defendant Nelson had specifically instructed the Smiths
that the latters' patrons were not to use the rear door
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(T. 94). Mr. Nelson checked the premises regularly twice
a day when he was in town, and if he ever saw the outside
rear door open, he would close and lock it (T. 99). Mr.
Nelson never had seen anyone use the outside rear door
other than employees of the two tenants, Gladys' and
Spice Rack, and service personnel (T. 100-101).
The Smiths gave general instructions to their employees
that shop patrons were not to use the rear door, and if
they saw a patron use the rear door, they specifically instructed them not to do so. The rear door was regularly
used only by employees of the shop, suppliers, deliverymen and paid models (T. 358). Mr. Smith understood that
it was Mr. Nelson's instructions that the outside rear door
was to be kept closed and locked at all times (T. 367).
While there may have been isolated occasions on
which Mr. or Mrs. Smith saw a patron use the rear door,
there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Nelson ever
saw or was aware of the fact that patrons may have
occasionally used the rear door.
The outside rear door, which weighs 140 lbs. (T.
375), was hung in such a fashion that when opened, even
slightly, and released, it would continue to swing to a
full open position (T. 376-377 & Ex. 29). Because of its
weight and the off-plumb manner in which it is hung, it
has swung open enough times with enough force to mark
the south, inside wall of the landing area (T. 376).
On the date of the accident, the plaintiff had an appointment at 2:00 p.m. at Gladys' Beauty Salon to have
her hair set. She parked near the front entrance and en-
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tered through the front door (T. 245-6). She left the
salon for a short period of time to pick u p her husband
with her car, apparently exiting through the front door
(T.246).
When Mrs. Black returned to the salon, she could
not find a parking space on University Avenue and so
she drove around the block and parked on First East
Street (T. 247). Since she did not want anyone to see
her with her hair in rollers, she decided to attempt to
enter the salon through the rear door. She had not entered the salon before by that route (T. 247), although
she had exited through the rear door on one prior occasion
during the previous winter (T. 248).
When Mrs. Black opened the door, it was light in the
landing area (T. 301). After she entered and "subconsciously batted" the door shut, it was dark (T. 249). She
thought she was as close to the beauty shop door as the
outer door, and so attempted to walk toward the beauty
shop door. She apparently did not see or notice the stairs
when she opened the outer door and walked into the landing area. She saw the rear door of the beauty salon (T.
250), but did not see the "EMPLOYEES ONLY" sign on
the door (T. 316), nor the stairs which were within a
foot or two of the door (T. 316, Ex. 3).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
There is no question from the rceord but that plaintiff knew that patrons of Gladys' Beauty Salon were expected to enter the salon by way of the front door, which
was an acknowledged safe entrance (T. 311). Also, there
is no question from the record that plaintiff was more
concerned with the problem of getting back into the
beauty shop and not being seen with curlers in her hair
(T. 247) than she was in making reasonable observations
for her own safety as she attempted to enter into the
beauty salon through its rear entrance. She was apparently in such a hurry that she did not remember the manner in which she closed the outside door after entering
into the landing area (T. 305-307), whether or not the
light in the landing area was "on" or "off" before closing
the door (T. 251), nor did she see that there was an "EMPLOYEES ONLY" sign on the door she intended entering
(T. 316), and she did not see the stairs adjacent to the
door she intended to enter (Ex. 3).
Plaintiff seems to contend that she was confronted
with a sudden emergency situation when she found herself in the unlighted landing area, after having closed
the door, which could not have closed by itself (T. 376377 & Ex. 29). But one cannot avoid the legal requirement
of exercising due care for one's own safety by invoking the
"sudden emergency" doctrine, if one participates in or con-
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tributes to the situation that caused the sudden emergency.
As stated in Zook vs. Bair, 514 P.2d 923, (Wash. 1973):
" . . . suddent emergency is appropriate when the
emergency is not brought about, in whole or in
part, by the negligence of the party seeking to invoke the doctrine. Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wash.
2d 845, 431 P.2d 156 (1967); Lee vs. Gotten Bros.
Co., 1 Wash. App. 202, 460 P.2d 694 (1969); W .
Prosser, Torts, Section 33 (3d ed. 1964)."
Factually, plaintiff is on the horns of a dilemma. If,
as she claims, the landing area was illuminated to the degree that she was unaware that the inside light was not
"on" when she opened the exterior door (T. 301), then
the area was illuminaetd sufficiently for her to see the
stairs which constituted the entire west side of the landing
area and was within a few inches of the door she intended
to enter (Ex. 3), and she was negligently inattentive in not
seeing what was there to be seen.
On the other hand, if when plaintiff opened the exterior door she could not readily see the stairs adjacent
to the rear door of the beauty salon, then she should not
have entered the area or closed the outside door before
determining if there was a light to turn on and where the
switch was located.
Regarding the obligation of seeing what is there to
be seen, this court has long required such as an obligation
of exercising due care for one's own safety. In Nuttall vs.
Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, 98 Utah 383,
99 P.2d 15 (1940), which involved the driver of an automobile which failed to see a train, the court said:
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"In this case after giving appellants the benefit of
the most favorable construction of the testimony
of their own witnesses the conclusion must be
reached that the deceased could have seen the train
in ample time to have stopped had he looked and
if he did look upon seeing the near approaching
light it became his duty to bring his automobile
to a stop. His failure to look or to act upon what
he saw if he did look bars a recovery here as a
matter of law. . /' (Emphasis added.)
This obligation was reaffirmed in Benson vs. Denver
and Rio Grande Railway Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286
P.2d 790 (1955), wherein the court stated:
". . . Since plaintiff testified that if he had seen
the train when within 20 feet of it he could have
stopped it compels the conclusion that he either
did not look or if he looked he did not heed what
he saw as was said by this court in the Nuttall case,
supra:
\ . . he could not, from the undisputed
facts appearing in the record, have used
that degree of ordinary care required of
him for his own safety/ " (Emphasis added.)
and in Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company,
7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957), the court observed:
". . . Where the physical facts and circumstances
are such that he could, by looking or listening,
have seen or heard the approach of the train, he
cannot be heard to say, that he looked and listened,
yet did not see or hear it. Under such circumstances
it is but natural to presume that the traveler either
did not look and listen, or that he failed to heed
what he perceived, and such conduct will generally
impute contributory negligence as a matter of law/9
(Emphasis added.)
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Also, in Richards vs. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d
59 (1959), summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed by this Court which noted that:
"It is a well settled rule that one may not be
heard to say that he did not see what was plain to
be seen. He either failed to look, or saw and failed
to heed, either of which makes him negligent/'
In case somewhat similar to the facts of the instant
case, Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Company, 16 Utah 2d 81,
395 P.2d 918 (1964), the Court affirmed a summary judgment against Whitman who had delivered merchandise
to a department store and in returning to his truck, went
through the first door he saw, opened it, turned to close
the door behind him and stepped off into an elevator
shaft. In its opinion the Court said:
"He appears to have violated a sound and often
echoed dictum which arises out of experience and
common sense to 'watch where you are going/
when no excuse was shown for his failure to do so."
With respect to the situation of walking into an area
which, because of darkness, one cannot see substantial
objects, if that be the fact situation, it is well established
in this jurisdiction that such conduct constitutes negligence
as a matter of law. In Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah
2d 174, 299 P.2d 124 (1956), plaintiff, as a social guest
attempting to find the bathroom in defendant's home,
mistakenly opened a door leading into the basement and
fell down an unlighted stairway. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in the following language:
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"Had appellant exercised ordinary and reasonable
care for her own safety, she would not have opened
a door and stepped into a dark and unlighted area
with which she was unacquainted without first
ascertaining what was beyond the door even
though she had not been told that the room to
which was going was lighted."
Also, in Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 278, 333 P.2d
630 (1959), the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries she
sustained in falling into an unrailed and unlighted stairwell in the garage portion of defendant's home. Plaintiff
had seen the stairway approximately ten months prior to
the accident, but temporarily forgot about it at the time
of the accident. The trial court entered judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the facts showed the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In
this regard the Court stated:
" W e have discussed the contentions as to defendant's primary negligence merely to indicate our
doubts as to its existence. But it is unnecessary to
resolve the issue as to whether a jury question
existed in that regard because of the view we take
of contributory negligence. It supports the trial
court's direction of a verdict against the plaintiff,
as will presently appear.
Plaintiff says that although she had prior
knowledge of the stairwell she could not be
charged with negligence as a matter of law for
walking into the open stairwell because in the
darkness it was a hidden danger in the area where
she might reasonably be expected to enter the
house because of the implied invitation; and justifies her failure to be aware of it by the fact that
her mind was preoccupied by the wedding plans
9
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and that it had been ten months since she had seen
it. In that regard she is confronted with a dilemma:
she either had in mind the existence of the stairwell
or she did not. If she did, she was obliged to guard
against the known hazard; if she did not she is
met with the principal recently affirmed by this
court in the case of Tempest vs. Richardson that a
guest could not enter heedlessly into the darkness
into an unknown area and then complain of damages there encountered."
And in Henry vs. Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah 2d
138, 355 P.2d 973 (I960), the plaintiff sued to recover
for injuries sustained when he fell down a darkened stairwell while looking for a rest room in the back of defendant's tavern. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court cited the negligent conduct of the plaintiff in the following particulars:
"Instead of inquiring, or observing at the north
end of the tavern where the rest rooms were, he
went to the south end of the tavern proper,
through some swinging doors into a room which
he said was so dark he could hardly see at all, and
groped his way along for about 25 feet, through
another, and fell down a stairway."
It is difficult to determine from plaintiff's testimony
whether she contends that the landing area was completely
dark, or whether she could see light under the rear door
of Gladys' as she attempted to walk toward it. As quoted
by plaintiff at page 10 of her brief, it appears from her
direct testimony (T. 249, Lines 13-23) that she could see
some light from under Gladys' rear door and attempted to
walk toward it:
10
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"QUESTION: What did you do when you found
yourself in the dark?
ANSWER: Well, by this time I was quite positive that I was just as close to one door as
I was to the other, because when I opened
the door I could see the passageway to the
Beauty Shop door, and I thought I was going
in that direction in the dark.
And rather than turn around I just didn't think to
turn around and go back to the door that had
closed on me. I didn't know where it was as
much as I knew where the lighted door was.
And I was going in that direction."
However, on cross-examination, plaintiff stated that she
could see no light under Gladys' rear door and that it was
pitch black when the outer door closed (T. 308, lines 1023):
"QUESTION: Now, the doorway where Gladys'
Beauty Salon, if there is a light on in the area
that is past the door, have you had enough
experience in this area to know whether or not
you could see light underneath the door?
ANSWER:

No.

QUESTION: Did you see any light whatsoever
underneath the door on the occasion that you
fell?
ANSWER:

No.

It was pitch-black.

QUESTION: And so there was no light whatsoever in the area?
ANSWER:

That's right.

QUESTION: It was absolutely pitch-black when
you were walking?
ANSWER:

Yes."
11
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Under the rule laid down in Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2
Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954), that a witness' testimony is no stronger than as left on cross-examination, the
latter version of the plaintiff's conduct must be accepted
for the purposes of this appeal.
POINT

II

THE DEFENDANT NELSON D I D N O T VIOLATE ANY D U T Y OWED T O PLAINTIFF.
There is nothing in the record to even suggest that
plaintiff, although a business invitee of Gladys' Beauty
Salon, had any express invitation of either the defendants
Smith or the defendant Nelson to use the rear entrance of
the building in patronizing the salon. The large exterior
metal door with no indication or advertisement of the
business within (Exs. 2 & 15) and the rear interior door
bearing the sign "EMPLOYEES ONLY" (Exs. 3 & 25)
would, in the absence of any oral invitation, preclude
the possibility of a finding by a jury that there was any
express invitation to plaintiff to use the rear entrance.
And, in fact, plaintiff admits that she never received any
express permission to use the rear entrance (T. 311, lines
20-26):
"QUESTION: But you hadn't asked anyone's
permission whatsoever, to do that? That is
correct, is it not?
ANSWER: That's correct. I never seen anybody
ask for permission to go out there.
QUESTION: But you certainly hadn't done, isn't
that correct?
ANSWER:

That's correct."
12
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The fact that plaintiff was an invitee of the beauty
salon did not give her license to use the premises indiscriminately. As stated in Bird vs. Cloverleaf Dairy, 102
Utah 330, 125 P.2d 797 (1942):
"We believe plaintiff's case is founded upon a
fallacy. An invitee must use the owner's premises
in the usual, ordinary, and customary way.9' (Emphasis added.)
Although plaintiff was admittedly "invited" to use the
front entrance to Gladys' Beauty Salon, she was no more
than a licensee or trespasser as to the rear portion and entrance of the building. In Hayward vs. Downing, et al,
112 Utah 508, 189 P.2d 442 (1948), this Court observed:
"A person may be an invitee as to a part of the
premises, and a mere licensee or a trespasser as to
other parts of the premises. A common example of
this is a store. As a general rule the public is invited to enter the store for the purpose of transacting business. However, this invitation
ordinarily
extends only to that part of the store where goods
are displayed for sale and business is ordinarily
transacted. Generally, the public is not invited to
enter the stockrooms, furnace rooms, and other
parts of the store, and if persons go to these parts
of the premises they lose their status as invitees
and become mere licensees or trespassers. 38 Am.
Jur. 761, Negligence, Sec. 100. See also haw and v.
California Products Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 147, 48
P.2d 979." (Emphasis added.)
If plaintiff had no invitation to use the rear portion
of the building, defendants had no duty to anticipate her
presence there, or to make the premises reasonably safe
for her. As stated in Bird vs. Cloverleaf Dairy, supra, a
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licensee takes the premises as he finds them and the possessor of land is required only to refrain from acts of negligence which may cause injury to him, and none were
alleged or proven in the instant case.
Plaintiff contends that on a few prior occasions she
bad seen patrons and employees of the beauty salon use
the rear entrance, and therefore, assumed she had implied
permission to likewise use the rear entrance. Whether
or not such observations created an implied invitation of
the Smith defendants to plaintiff to use the rear entrance is
immaterial as to the defendant Nelson, since there is no
evidence in the record that he had ever seen or had reason
to believe that patrons of either Gladys' or his other tenant,
the Spice Rack, had or would use the rear entrance. Indeed, the defendant Smith acknowledged that Mr. Nelson
had advised him that the outside rear door was to remain
closed and locked at all times (T. 376).
Therefore, even if the Court should determine that
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence should
have been submitted to the jury, the judgment of dismissal
in favor of the defendant Nelson should be affirmed since
there is no evidence in the record that the defendant Nelson knew of any circumstances out of which one could
conclude that he had granted an express or implied invitation for patrons of his tenants to use the rear entrance
to the building; and, in the absence of having granted an
express or implied invitation, he had no affirmative duty
to make the premises safe for patrons, even assuming,
arguendo, that they were not.
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Although the trial court based its ruling which granted defendants' motions for a directed verdict on the
ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law, and even if the trial court erred in so doing,
if the judgment was proper on other grounds, as we believe it was with respect to the defendant Nelson, it should
be affirmed in the interest of judicial economy as was
noted by the Court in Rasmussen vs. Davis, 1 Utah 2d 96,
262 P.2d 488 (1953):
". . . We feel constrained therefore, to affirm, in
the light of our accepted policy of so doing if the
conclusion reached, though based on incorrect reasons, is in fact correct for some other reason."
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted defendants' respective motions for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all
the evidence since the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, which was her own testimony, was
that when she opened the rear exterior door, the area
inside was so well illuminated that she was unaware that
the artificial light was not on, yet she failed to see the
"EMPLOYEES ONLY" sign on the interior door, or the
stairway which was adjacent thereto and less than ten
feet away. After she closed the exterior door it was "pitchblack," yet she attempted to walk toward a door she could
not see.
Further, even if the trial court erred in directing plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law, the
judgment of dismissal entered was still proper with respect to the defendant Nelson since plaintiff introduced
no evidence during trial from which a jury could have
15
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found that the defendant Nelson either expressly or impliedly invited the plaintiff to use the rear portion of the
building in question; and, in the absence of such an invitation, he owed no affirmative duty to the plaintiff to make
the premises safe for her, and he was not guilty of any
negligent act toward her while she was on the premises.
WHEREFORE, defendant Nelson respectfully prays
that the trial court's judgment of dismissal as to him be
affirmed and that he be awarded his costs herein.
Respectfully submitted this ....^T... day of May, 1974.
H . Wayne Wadsworth
HANSON, W A D S W O R T H
& RUSSON
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for RespondentDefendant Nelson
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of this brief were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Jackson Howard, Attorney
for Plaintiff-Appellant, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah
and to Ray H. Ivie, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Smith, 48 North University, Provo, Utah this ..&Z... day
of May, 1974.
H. Wayne Wadsworth
Attorney for Respondent Nelson
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